Werner's set-theoretical model is one of the simplest models of CCω. It combines a functional view of predicative universes with a collapsed view of the impredicative sort Prop. However this model of Prop is so coarse that the principle of excluded middle P ∨ ¬P holds. In this paper, we interpret Prop into a topological space (a special case of Heyting algebra) to make it more intuitionistic without sacrificing simplicity. We prove soundness and show some applications of our model.
Introduction
There are various models of type theory. Werner's Settheoretical model [14] provides an intuitive model of CC ω . It combines a functional view of predicative universes with a collapsed view of the impredicative sort Prop. However this model of Prop is so coarse that the principle of excluded middle P ∨ ¬P holds in it.
In this paper, we construct a set-theoretical model of CC ω in which the principle of excluded middle P ∨ ¬P doesn't hold, and thus closer to completeness. CC (the Calculus of Constructions [5] ) is a pure type system [2] with two sorts, impredicative Prop and predicative Type. CC ω extends CC with a hierarchy of predicative sorts Type i . CIC (the Calculus of Inductive Constructions) adds inductive types to CC ω .
In Ref. [14] , Werner provides a remarkably simple model of CIC. In this model, λx : A.t is interpreted by a set-theoretical function for predicative sorts. Yet such a simple approach is known to fail for impredicative sorts as it runs afoul of Reynolds' paradox [11] . Therefore, the model for Prop is two-valued. Hence the principle of excluded middle P ∨ ¬P is valid in this model, making it classical. Later, Miquel and Werner [10] have shown that proving the soundness of this model was not so easy, but this doesn't change the simplicity of the model itself. This simple approach is to be contrasted with Luo's model of ECC (CC ω extended with strong sums Σx : A.B) which uses ω-sets [8] , or more recent models such as categorical models [7] or models based on homotopy theory [12] . This is the drawback of simplicity: while Werner's approach avoids many complications of more precise models, it is at times counter-intuitive, as it completely ignores the intuitionistic aspect of CC. Our goal has been to recover the intuitionistic part of CC with- garrigue@math.nagoya-u.ac.jp out increasing the complexity of the model. Barras [4] provided a first way to do it, by interpreting CC ω in IZF (intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory [1] ) rather than ZF. While this is an interesting result, and the fact it is backed by a fully formalized proof is very impressive, this requires one to work in the radically different world of IZF, where it is difficult to express metareasoning about the expressiveness of the language. For this reason we prefer to stay inside classical set theory ZF, but we change the interpretation of Prop to be some topological space. The open sets of a topological space form a Heyting algebra. Heyting algebras are used when constructing models of intuitionistic logic, but usually their elements are not understood as sets. In our model, proofs shall be interpreted as elements of denotations of propositions, hence these denotations must be sets, and the order must be set inclusion. Using topological spaces solves this problem. Despite the fact that the interpretation of Prop is many valued, we avoid Reynolds' paradox by making the interpretation of proofs undistinguished. Due to proof-irrelevance, this model still validates some propositions that are not provable, hence this model does not reach completeness yet. However this is sufficient to exclude many classical propositions such as the principle of excluded middle P ∨ ¬P or the linearity axiom (P → Q) ∨ (Q → P). Note that, to make the model coherent, we had to slightly restrict the type system CC ω , in particular not allowing propositions to be parametrized by proofs, and we named it CCω (read CC-omegaminus). We believe the scope is still sufficient to make this model practical, but hope to remove these restrictions in the future. This model is parametrized by a topological space (X, O(X)) and a point p ∈ X, which is called the reference point * 1 . By replacing the parameters of the model, we can make it more or less precise. For instance if its parameters are the topological space ({·}, {∅, {·}}) and the reference point '·', we obtain a model of classical logic, which is the coarsest one. It suffices to add one more point and shift the reference point to invalidate the principle of excluded middle. * 1 Our proof of soundness requires this reference point to satisfy a condition, which is called the point condition.
c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan In Section 2, we define the language of the type system CCω. In Section 3, we give our set-theoretical interpretation of CCω, and prove its soundness. In Section 4, we show some applications of this model. For instance, we show that the excluded middle cannot be derived from the linearity axiom in CCω. In Section 5, we analyze how we avoid Reynolds' paradox.
Definition of CCω
We define the type system CCω as follows. Definition 2.1 (Term). Let V be an infinite set of variables.
• For all x ∈ V, x is a term with free variables fv(x) = {x}.
• In CCω, propositions are types which belong to the impredicative sort Prop, and proofs are terms of types which represent propositions. Next, we give a definition of propositions and proofs as follows. Rather than introducing an explicitly sorted type system like in Ref. [10] , we will prove that these definitions are stable under substitution, weakening, and reduction, so that we can safely use them when defining our interpretation. 
Thanks to uniqueness of typing in Lemma 2.6, the function (ii) It is clearly proved by applying the result of (i) in this lemma, since variables in Δ do not appear in Γ 2 and terms A and B.
Lastly, here are some notations allowing to use other logical symbols [3] . Definition 2.15.
(when x f v(B)),
Interpretation

Lattice
Several interpretations of type theory have been proposed such as using ω-sets [8] or coherent spaces [6] . In this paper, we use Heyting algebras [9] , [13] for propositions. Heyting algebras provide models of intuitionistic logic. The open sets of a topological space can be given the structure of a Heyting algebra (see Lemma 3.2) , and as such provide models of intuitionistic logic too [13] . We give a definition of lattice and Heyting algebra as follows. The following lemma shows that topological spaces are complete Heyting algebras. * 3 We use the lattice operation symbols join ' ' and meet ' ' instead of '∨' and '∧', since we use the latter as logical symbols.
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Lemma 3.2. Any topological space (X, O(X)) is a Heyting algebra, moreover it is a complete lattice.
Proof. Let a ≤ b be a ⊂ b, and define each operation as follows:
The following lemma states well known properties of complete Heyting algebras. Lemma 3.3. Let (A, ≤) be a complete Heyting algebra. Then the following conditions hold.
Preparation of the Interpretation
Let p, which is called the reference point, be some point of the topological space (X, O(X)) such that the following condition Next, we introduce Grothendieck universes, which are closed under dependent-function construction, and which we will use to interprete Type i . Definition 3.5. Let α be an ordinal. We define V α as follows when α is a limit ordinal) .
We define a universe U(i) as follows
where λ i is the i-th inaccessible cardinal.
The following lemma is necessary when proving soundness. Lemma 3.6.
(
and y ∈ x imply y ∈ U(i) (vii) x ∈ U(i) and y ⊂ x imply y ∈ U(i)
Interpretation of the Judgments
In this model, a type T is interpreted into a set [[T ]], and a context x 1 : T 1 ; x 2 : T 2 ; · · · ; x n : T n is interpreted into a dependent tuple; in particular, when there are no dependent types in the context, it is a tuple in [[ 
where () represents the empty sequence.
(iii) Definition of the interpretation of a judgment [[Γ t]] If t is a proof term for Γ, then its interpretation is the reference point.
[ [
[Γ t]](γ) := p Otherwise, if Γ t : T is derivable and T is not a proposition for Γ, we follow the definition in
We choose to interprete all proof terms by the reference point p, which represents (absolute) truth. However, for this to make sense from a Heyting algebra point of view, we need all proofs in the valuation γ to be also true, i.e., to be p. Hence we use the strict-interpretation to define contexts, which ensures exactly that property. Concerning Table 2 represents universal quantification, and again we use the infinite meet operator of the complete Heyting algebra to express it. In the last case only the representation becomes a set theoretical dependent function. Note that while we intend our interpretation to be total on well-typed terms, until soundness is proved we must assume that the intepretation of application is partial, since the interpretation of u might not be a function graph, and the interpretation of v could be outside of its domain.
We start with the weakening and substitution lemmas. They show that our interpretation is well behaved.
Lemma 3.8 (interpretation of weakening). The following equation holds [[Γ t]](γ) = [[Γ; Δ t]](γ, δ)
when both sides are well defined.
Proof. If t is a proof term, it is clear by Lemma 2.12. If t is not a proof term, it is proved by induction on the term t. The subtle point is the case of PI-Type. However the value of PT Γ,x (A, B) is invariant by Lemma 2.14 (ii).
Our substitution lemma is similar to those in Refs. [14] and [10] . Lemma 3.9 (interpretation of substitution). We assume Γ u : U is derivable. If Γ; (x : U); Δ is well formed and
holds (with all interpretations defined), then
holds. Moreover, in
the right hand side is defined whenever the left hand side is, and the equation holds for all t and T such that Γ; (x : U); Δ t : T is derivable.
Proof. If t is a proof term, it is clear by Lemma 2.11. It t is not a proof term, it is provable by induction on term t by using Lemmas 3.8 and 2.14 (i) in the same way as Ref. [10] .
Finally we prove the following theorem about the interpretation of logical symbols in Definition 2.15. It demonstrates the validity of the interpretation.
Theorem 3.10 (interpretation of logical symbols).
By using Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.8 we have the followings:
Hence we have a = b by Lemma 3.3 (7) since a b b a = X.
](γ) = X and Lemma 3.3 (8), we have the following fact:
Hence, the statement holds.
Soundness
We are now ready to prove the soundness of this type system. Theorem 3.11 (soundness). We assume γ ∈ [[Γ]].
(1) If t 1 = β t 2 , and Γ t 1 : T, Γ t 2 : T are derivable, then
Proof.
(1) If t 1 is a proof term, then t 2 is also a proof term by Lemma 2.10, hence the statement holds. If not, it is sufficient that [[Γ (λx : U.
t) u]](γ) = [[Γ t[x\u]]](γ)
. By using Lemma 3.9,
Hence, the statement holds. (2) This is proved by induction on the Typing Rules in Table 1 . For details, see Appendix A.1. We must be careful in the case of Abstraction, i.e., T = ∀x : A.B and PT Γ,x (A, B) = TP. To prove the soundness, we need the following equation
This equation does not hold in general, however we can obtain it by assuming the point condition at p.
Corollary 3.12. If P is a provable propositional term for Γ, then
holds.
Application
Let us compare Werner's classical model with our intuitionistic model on some simple cases.
Classical Model
We start with the simplest case. Let the topological space be the simplest one, which is the trivial topological space with its base set the singleton {a}.
This coincides with Werner's Model [14] . However this model is so coarse that it represents classical logic, since the principle of excluded middle holds.
If we want to be more discriminating, we need more open sets in O(X).
Models Disproving Excluded Middle
Now, let us consider the next simplest topological space. To do this, we add a new point 'b' and a new open set {a, b} into the topological space. 0  1  2  0  2  0  0  1  2  2  1  2  2  2  2   Table 4 Value of x y for X = {a, b, x}.
This statement is derived by using the following equations.
By our soundness theorem, this proves that the principle of excluded middle cannot be deduced in CCω. Yet this model is not fully intutionistic as the linearity axiom (P → Q) ∨ (Q → P) holds, since we have the following fact by Table 3 .
This is actually interesting because it shows that we can use this model to prove non trivial facts, for instance that the excluded middle cannot be deduced from the linearity axiom in CCω. In- In this model, (P → Q) ∨ (Q → P) does not hold, since we have the following fact by Table 4 .
Reynolds' Paradox
There is a problem when expanding the set theoretical model, which is called Reynolds' paradox [11] . Basically Reynolds' paradox says that if the interpretation of an impredicative sort has more than one element, it causes a cardinality paradox in the set theoretical model. This seems to be in contradiction with our model, so in this section we will analyze its assumptions.
Outline of the Paradox
Let J be an impredicative sort, i.e., if Γ A : s and Γ; (x : A) B : J are derivable for any sort s then Γ ∀x : A.B : J is derivable.
We assume that there exists a type B whose sort is J such that [[B] ] has at least two elements, i.e.,
In Ref. [11] Reynolds says that the existence of such a term B causes a paradox in set-theoretical models. First, we define the category Sets J and the endofunctor T of Sets J . Definition 5.1.
• Let Sets J be a category with:
]] The paper [11] claims the following lemma: Lemma 5.2.
• ∃u ∈ Obj(Sets J ), ∃H ∈ Hom(T u, u) s.t. 
Avoiding the Paradox
In CCω, we have an impredicative sort Prop, and there is a type B of Prop such that [[B] ] ≥ 2. However, this doesn't cause a paradox. In fact, to prove the existence of a function H ∈ T u → u, Reynolds constructs a term t of type ((P → B) → B) → P in the proof of lemma 2 in Ref. [11] , where P is a type such that 
since both P and B are propositional terms. Thus this discussion moves to the Heyting algebra part of the model where we need not fear such paradox.
Future Work
There are still three remaining questions we would like to answer in the future: whether the point condition is really needed to prove soundness; whether we can handle full CC ω , without our restrictions on the type system, or even CIC, including inductive types; and how close to completeness is our model. The point condition is very restrictive. It seems to require p to be an isolated point. Hence we would like to remove it to allow a wider variety of models. In fact we have not found any counterexample when removing the point condition, up to now.
We would also like to lift the restrictions on the PI-Type rule, which prohibits statements about proofs, and on the subtyping rule. They come from the fact that, in the interpretation of contexts, we use the strict interpretation, which restricts all propositional terms to either ∅ or the singleton {p}, so that we cannot build an element when the non-strict interpretation, while being non-empty, does not contain p. We have been considering several approaches to overcome this problem, with some success. While we are confident that this can be achieved, this seems to require more restrictions on the topological spaces one could use as model of propositions. We shall then consider adding inductive types (and their elimination schemes) to that more expressive interpretation.
While this model rejects the excluded middle, it still admits proof-irrelevance 
Then, we must prove the following equation:
But it is clear * 4 by induction of hypothesis. However S S hold in general, since S is the interior of S when S is non empty subset of X. Now, we apply the point condition here * 5 . We have This is the only place we need it in the proof.
[[Γ ∀x : A.B]](γ) = [[Γ B]](γ) [[Γ A]](γ)
.
By characteristic of Heyting algebra, [[Γ B]](γ) ⊂ [[Γ ∀x : A.B]](γ).
By induction hypothesis p ∈ [[Γ B]](γ)
, so that the condition holds in this case. 
By Lemma 3.9, we have [[Γ; (x : A) B]](γ, [[Γ v]](γ)) = [[Γ B[x\v]]](γ).
Hence, the statement holds in this case. 
By Lemma 3.9 and the fact [[Γ v]](γ) ∈ [[Γ A]](γ), we have p ∈ [[Γ B[x\v]]](γ).
B]](γ) ∩ [[Γ A]](γ) ⊂ [[Γ B]](γ).
Then we have c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan
